ethics, Schiller's theory of tragedy, Hegel's philosophy of history, and social contract theories. In focusing on the analysis of Pamela, my purpose here will be to describe the mechanics of the trial narrative and its structural effects on the idea of happiness-effects from which we have yet to recover.
The Classical Hermeneutic of Happiness: Happiness in Mourning
The secret achievement of the trial narrative is that it wrenches the idea of happiness free from its ground in narrative and roots it in the body and affect. In order to understand how the trial narrative performs this operation, we need to consider what it might mean for the idea of happiness to be dependent on narrative. Our own conceptions of happiness are so hopelessly affective, so unrelated to narrative, that the labor of the trial narrative will remain invisible until we can reconstruct a conception of happiness predicated on biographical narration. We can take our cues from moral theorists such as MacIntyre, Nussbaum and Annas, who have argued that classical ideas of happiness and virtue were grounded in narrati~e.~ For the purposes of my argument, however, we cannot rely on the reconstruction of the classical idea by these moral theorists. Because they return to Aristotle rather than Solon,3 they obscure fundament2 features of the classical idea that are needed to make sense of the eighteenth-century transformation. Let us then interpret Solon's proverb, "Call no one happy until deadT4 in order to excavate a concept of happiness that is the antithesis of our own and unthinkable without narrative, It is easy to interpret Solon's proverb in familiar ways that make it compatible with our own notion of happiness as something we experimce. But there is another reading of Solon's proverb, one that is easy to overlook because it requires that we not assume, as we too easily do, that happiness is an experience. According to this reading, the judgment of happiness must wait until the end of a life because our lives are filled with contingency (Herodotus 1.32; Plutarch 114) . In a life given over to chance, the judgment of happiness can only be a judgment about the tofalify and heterogeneity of a life-and thus, judgment cannot be pronounced until death. It follows that the judgment must be made not by the one whose happiness is in question but by others. Croesus, though convinced Eighteenth-century notions of happiness retain many features that are unmistakably classical in their provenance. See Jones 61-98; Mauzi 15; Potkay 12; Rsstvig. Yet, it is precisely the classical idea's relation to narrative that does not translate into the eighteenth century.
Solon often fares poorly in the comparison with Aristotle, even in an account as sympathetic as White's (109) . Philosophical denigration of Solon's proverb has a long history; see Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.10; Cicero 2.27,3.22; Hegel, Vorlesungen 1: 180-87.
I will rely on Herodotus' story of Solon's encounter with Croesus; in The History, Solon does not utter the proverb in the exact form cited, though the proverb captures the gist of his explanation as to why he cannot pronounce Croesus happy (1.32). The proverb itself was commonplace in the ancient world and is paraphrased in a number of sources, often without attribution to Solon. See Plutarch 114; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1: 10; Aeschylus 923-24; Sophocles, Oedipus the King 1683-84, and Women of Trachis 2-3; and Ovid 55. For additional ancient occurrences of the proverb, see White, Sovereign Virtue 58 11. 30; see also Irwin, "Permanent Happiness, " 28 n.3. that he is the happiest person alive, nevertheless submits the question of his happiness for another (Solon) to decidee5 The possibility of such a judgment of one's life by others requires that they have access to the totality and heterogeneity of one's life, and the only conceivable form of such access is narrative. This is precisely why, in Herodotus and Plutarch, Solon accounts for his judgment with schematic narratives of the lives of those whom he calls happy. Happiness, in this view, does not refer to a mood or emotion, lodged in the inscrutable recesses of a subject, as ; it is not some pule feeling of pleasure, joy or satisfaction not even the feeling of existence and plenitude that Rousseau describes (Reveries 88). In fact, it is not a feeling at all. Rather, it names the judgment passed by others on the public narrative of a life. The judgment of happiness must always be made in mourning, because it cannot be made before death. The classical funeral oration provided the ideal institutional location for a Solonian judgment of happiness, offering the occasion to reflect on the narrative of a complete life in a public space.6
The deferrd of the judgment of happiness until death does not mean that one suddenly becomes happy whm dead, as though happiness itself awaits us at the end of a life; nor does it imply that the question of happiness is irrelevant while we are alive. On the contrary, the question of happiness must be considered to be at stake at every moment of one's life; precisely because every moment is potentially important, the judgment cannot be executed summarily before the end of a life. To describe this situation in which the question of happiness governs every moment of a life, but the judgment of happiness is deferred to its conclusion, one might speak of a hermeneutic of happiness that constitutes the interpretive horizon for the narrative of a life. "Hermeneutic" is the right term because there can be no simple formula according to which one adjudicates the question of happiness. If narratives are heterogeneous and cannot be subordinated to a single abstract principle (such as pleasure), then the hermeneutic of happiness must interpret a narrative with no sure rules in hand, committed only to the logic of the narrative itself and to the social. institutions and structures of meaning in which it is embedded. The question of happiness is a question about the highest good, the summum bonum, not because it determines in advance some optimal state or experience that everyone must strive to achieve, but because the form of the question accords full weight to the entirety of an individual life. The dassical hermeneutic of happiness is the basis-a ground without ground-for an anti-foundationalist humanism.
Because of the peculiar formal property of the classical idea of happiness, that it is a judgment about the totality of a life's narrative, no question that is of concern for a life is excluded from consideration when making the judgment. Freedom, virtue, pleasure, success, and material attainments are all legitimate concerns when deciding the question of happiness (Aristotle, Rhetoric 13SOb 14-30).
For this reason, the judgment of happiness is relevant to every biographical narrative, no matter what the narrative's particular concern^.^ Biographical narratives can be viewed as soliciting the judgment of happiness implicitly, simply by their existence as particular narrative totalities. But were this not the case, we could nevertheless say that biographical narratives are incapable of resisting the imposition of the question of happiness in its Solonian form. Strictly speaking, then, it is impossible to suspend the Solonian hermeneutic of happiness once it is in place. If the question of happiness asks about every aspect of a life, how do you stop somebody from wondering whether a life just ended was a happy one?
The Mechanics of the Trial Narrative in Pamela
We have arrived at an impasse. Because the Solonian hermeneutic is impossible to suspend, it would seem that there can be no history of Solonian happiness. Yet Solon's narrative conception of happiness, which can only be judged by others, has almost nothing in common with our own saccharine understanding of happiness." Solonian happiness must have a history. How are we to account for this paradox? The secret to this strange history is the trial narrative, pioneered in influential and popular novels of the eighteenth century (Pamela, Clarissa, The Vicar of Wdkefiefd, Julie) and radicalized in Kant's ethics. The ruse of the trial narrative is precisely to bring about the suspension of the hermeneutic of happiness through a set of audacious narrative strategies.
To locate this anti-Solonian development in the eighteenth-century novel is counterintuitive. The novel, at its inception, is biographical in form (LukAcs 77; McKeon; Starr; Spacks; F. Nussbaum), which would seem to make it the ideal narrative vehicle for a Solonian judgment of happiness. The very terms I have used to describe Solonian narratives are the ones often used to describe novels. Theorists of the form have argued that the novel "still thinks in terms of totality" (LukBcs 56) and that it grapples with death and human finitude (Bernstein 1 3 6 37). Yet the emergence of the novel in the eighteenth century is precisely where we must look to find the dissolution of Solonian happiness. Richardson's Pamela-called "the best seller of the century" by Habermas (43) and the "first true novel" by Ian Watt (173)9-provides the ideal location to study the workings Ricoeur remains the rare narratologist to have understood the importance of happiness in a discussion of narrative (44). But because he universalizes his insight and relegates the problem of happiness to the level of plot twists, he fails to see how the reference to happiness can be suspended in a narrative like Pamela. " n the contemporary psychological conception of happiness, which remains affective and subjective desp~te the desire for a more capacious eudaimonistic conception, see Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi. Cf. Nettle.
On the "Pamela vogue," see of the trial narrative for at least two reasons. First, because the trial narrative is not yet an established narrative paradigm in Pamela, the narrative labor required to dismantle a hermeneutic of happiness and install a hermeneutic of trial is clearly legible in the novel. Second, because Pamela does not credit its own narrative achievement, it still believes it possible to narrate a time of happiness, not simply in the sequel but in the last third of the novel itself. Pamela thus allows us to understand why a narrative of happiness fails when it is preceded by a narrative of trial.
From the meta-narrative perspective of the reader, Pamela can be divided into two parts: Pamela's virtue, which is proved to be such through the many trials she must undergo in the first half, is rewarded by happiness through her marriage to a wealthy squire, Mr. B, in the second half. For the reader, as for Mr. B, Pamela's trials are necessary if the startling outcome of the novel, a servant's marriage to a squire in early eighteenth-century England, is to be at all plausible, Pamela's exemplary virtue can be discerned by readers only because she endures trials that would overwhelm other individuals. Although the bipartite structure of the narrative-trial followed by happiness-appears in hindsight to have structured the novel from the very beginning, both the reader and Mr. B must be taught to read the novel in this way. In fact, when one of Mr. B's earliest attempts to seduce Pamela accomplishes nothing other than frightening her, he invokes the idea of a trial in a transparent attempt to excuse his behavior: "I own I have demean'd myself; but it was only to t y you" (24, emphasis added). Only much later is he able to say, more sincerely: "you bring me what is infinitely more valuable, an experienc'd truth, a well-ty'd Virtue" (337, emphasis added). For him to make this claim, not oniy must he test Pamela through his cruel and unjust behavior toward her, but he must also understand his actions as constituting a test. Only Pamela's narrative can teach him this. The labor that Pamela's narrative must perform, a hermeneutic labor, is to transform the Mr. B of the first statement, for whom the trial is simply an excuse, into the Mr. B of the second statement, for whom the trial is the source of value itself.
Before the reader and Mr. B can learn to interpret the first half of Pamela as a trial narrative, Pamela herself must be brought to understand the narrative of her life in these terms. Because each trial can be read as contributing to her unhappiness, however, her recounting of the empirical multiplicity of trials she encounters at the hands of Mr. B does not suffice to produce a trial narrative. She must learn instead to interpret the events in her life not as hardships that add to her unhappiness but as trials that prove something about her regardless of her happiness." Pamela's correspondence with her parents at the beginning of the novel is more than a narrative device to justify her endless and detailed accounts of herself, Her parents teach her how to understand her life as she will later teach others. The didactic and hermeneutic labor of the novel is repeated at several different levels. In her first letters home, Pamela is flattered by Mr. B's taking lo The rhetoric of the new science, and particularly the experiment, permeates the eighteenthcentury discourse of sensibility (Van Sant). The biographical trial should be understood in relation to spiritual biography, the scientific experiment and the judicial trial, all forms that are important for the emergent novel. particular notice of her, which she takes to be innocent and even benevolent: "To be sure I did nothing but curchee and cry, and was all in Confusion, at his Goodness. Indeed he is the best of Gentlemen, I think!" (13). Her parents respond to this letter with an admonition to caution and virtue, which prepares the ground for the displacement of the hermeneutic of happiness by another hermeneutic: They thus enjoin Pamela to see and interpret the events in her life with a suspicion that, in always expecting the worst, puts on hold all thought of happiness. But through their example, they also hope to teach Pamela that happiness is not the appropriate horizon within which to interpret one" finite existence: "in the Midst of our Poverty and Misfortunes, we have trusted in God's Goodness, and been honest, and doubt not to be happy hereafter, if we continue to be good, tho' our Lot is hard here" (14). During the finite portion of existence, they seem to be saying, all that one should expect is suffering, and all that is to be expected from anyone is endurance and virtue. Finally, they enjoin Pamela to adopt a similar attitude with regard to her own life: "If you love us then, if you value God's blessing, and your own future happiness, we both charge you to stand upon your Guard" (14) . To be on one's guard means precisely to adopt a different hermeneutic toward the world-one in which events are interpreted with fear and suspicion. For now, not only must the judgment of happiness be deferred, as Solon demands, but questions of happiness must also be bracketed. The question that must govern Pamela's life is "Does this threaten my virtue?" and not "Is this conducive to my happiness?" Concern with questions of happiness could lead to complacency and a lowering of her guard. What her parents demand is a fundamental change in the hermeneutic frame in which her life is interpreted. Even so, we cannot be certain that the two questions are considered mutually exclusive: an attitude of fear may still have happiness in view. I refer to the narratological suspension that occurs at this point in the text as an epoch : it is the first element of the trial narrative, but it does not alone suffice to suspend the hermeneutic of happiness.ll
The letter from Pamelars parents begins to take effect almost immediately. Pamela's response reveals that she has begun to view the world differently as a result of the cautionary letter: "I Must needs say, that your Letter has fill'd me with much Trouble. For it has made my Heart, which was overflowing with Gratitude for my young Master's Goodness, suspicious and fearful; and yet, I hope I never shall find him to act unworthy of his Character" (15). Pamela's fear and suspicion prepare the ground for suspending the hermeneutic of happiness.
The epoch is a seventeenth-century narrative strategy that can be found not only in Descartes' biographicai narrative, where it makes possible the transition from an existential to an epistemological regime, but also in the social contract theories of Hobbes and Locke.
However, through her fear and suspicion, Pamela may continue to believe that happiness is at stake at every moment of her life, in the classical sense, and that fear and suspicion make her unhappy. She may consider her virtue as an indispensable element in her happiness. Or she might accept fear and suspicion as ineradicable but not antagonistic to happiness. A subsequent letter home exemplifies the Solonian persistence of the hermeneutic of happiness and its almost inevitable priority for biographical narratives, when Pamela concludes with the following schematic narrative of her life: "How happy was I a-while ago! How miserable now!" (27).
In addition to the epoch , the trial narrative requires a specific way of construing events that not only gives them a meaning outside the opposition of happiness and unhappiness but also makes this other meaning primary, even to the exclusion of the question of happiness. Significantly, it is none other than Mr. B who introduces the second element necessary for a trial narrative effectively to suspend the hermeneutic of happiness-the idea of a test-and he does so at the very moment when his disturbing intentions toward Pamela first become clear beyond a doubt (24).12 It is not surprising, then, that Pamela remains unconvinced by Mr. B' s suggestion of a test, since he only offers it to excuse his behavior.
Her parents' next letter, which responds to Pamela's narration of her life in terms of happiness, is the decisive one. In their symbolically didactic role, her parents present an alternative paradigm for understanding her life, in which the hermeneutic of happiness gives way to a hermeneutic of trial. The suspension or epoch brackets off a time of life as a state of emergency belonging to a different hermeneutic, and the narrative of testing gives this hermeneutic a concrete meaning not only independent of but also opposed to the hermeneutic of happiness. The very events that would have a negative valence within the hermeneutic of happiness now acquire a positive valence within the hermeneutic of trial: Within the space of a sentence, her parents enact the hermeneutic shift they want Pamela to perform. They acknowledge that, when seen from within a hermeneutic of happiness, trials "are sore things" without rhyme or reason. Classically,
IZ As with the suspension or qtofh , there is nothing new in the idea of a test. What is new in
Pamela is the combination of the narrative strategies of suspension and testing to produce the suspension of the hermeneutic of happiness. The narrative of testing finds perhaps its purest exemplification in the Arthurian romances of Chrktien de Troyes. In these romances, testing of the protagonists does not occur accidentally, as it does in the Odyssey or in Greek romances such as Longus' Daphnis and Chloe or Xenophon's An Ephesian Tale; testing is a way of life for knights, and they must constantly seek out tests to prove their knightly valor (Auerbach 140). Although romances are always a series of ordeals or trials, the trial narrative produces a specific meaning not found in earlier romances.
trials would have no value of their own, though they may perhaps have value with a view to happiness. But her parents argue that trials must be granted a dignity of meaning outside the hermeneutic of happiness, because of the specifically epistemological function they perform in the course of a biographical narrative: "without them, we know not our selves, nor what we are able to do." Regardless of whether they contribute to her happiness or not, Pamela's trials will allow her to know something about herself-namely, her virtue. Pamela's trials are not to be interpreted within a hermeneutic of happiness, but within a hermeneutic of trial, where they prove something about her. The effect of the trial narrative is to replace existential questions of happiness with epistemological questions of virtue.
In what sense is a trial narrative necessary to glean a knowledge of the self? Why is the suffering of the trial considered indispensable to the proof of virtue? Pamela's parents imply that, unless her virtue proves itself during the harsher conditions of the trial, she could be suspected of being virtuous only for lack of opportunity to be otherwise. Unlike Aristotelian virtue, which was lived as practical activity (Nicomachean Ethics 1098b 31), and therefore could not conceal itself without failing to be virtue, Pamela's virtue or honor, which is synonymous with chastity, would remain concealed even had she led a perfectly chaste and virtuous life. By this logic-a truly Satanic logic, as we know from the Book of Job13-a trial by adversity is required to force this virtue into the light of day, and the degree of suffering one endures is taken to be a measure of the reliability of the trial.14 Although Pamela must undergo a trial in order to be rewarded by marriage to Mr. B, it is essential that she not endure the trial fox the sake of some ultimate happiness or reward. That would compromise the reliability of the trial; the trial only works if it is endured for its own sake. Whereas for Aristotle or Solon, virtue is an indispensable element of happiness, for Pamela, virtue is set in opposition to happiness through the complex strategy of the trial narrative.
The didactic intervention of her parents' letters shapes the rhetoric of trial that in turn begins to guide Pamela's self-presentation. After Mr. B' s second attempt to force himself on her, he calls her to an interview in which he plans to dismiss her. Anticipating this interview, she imagines herself arraigned before an unjust judge: "0 Pamela, said E to my self, why art thou so foolish and fearful! Thou hast done no harm! what, if thou fearest an unjust Judge, when thou art innocent, wouldst thou do before a just one, if thou wert guilty?" (33-34). From this point on, Pamela uses the rhetoric of trial to describe her situation. Of another of Mr. B' s attempts on her virtue, she has this to say: "0 this was a dreadful Trial! This was the worst of all!" (64). Intervening to explain her abduction to Lincolnshire and the change from letters to Pamela's journal, the "editor" likewise uses the language of trial to describe Pamela's captivity: "the fair Pamela's Tryals were not yet over; but the worst of all were to come, at a Time when she thought them a11 at an End" (92). But while these metaphors are indications of the shift in herme- neutic frames that I have been describing, proof that the hermeneutic of trial governs the first half of the narrative rests on the structure of the narrative itself and the interpretation it elicits.
Nothing proves that the hermeneutic of trial is firmly installed during her captivity at the Lincolnshire estate better than Pamela's deliberations about suicide. Richardson does not haphazardly insert the Christian prohibition against suicide here as a conduct-book piety for the edification of readers or as an unrefiected dogma. On the contrary, this prohibition finds its justification through the hermeneutic of trial, without which it could not acquire the character of an absolute prohibition. When Pamela's attempt to escape from the Lincolnshire estate fails, and she is compelled to spend the night outside, she begins to contemplate suicide as the only means of escaping Mr. B's clutches. At first, she resorts to the conventional argument that suicide is a transgression against God's authority, but it is the logic of the trial narrative that uitimately keeps her from this act: The hermeneutic of happiness is incapable of rationalizing this radical prohibition; indeed, it makes suicide available as a possibility. From the perspective of the trial, however, suicide can only spring from a desire to avoid the severity of the test. To pass the test, one must confront its challenges directly, since to alter the conditions of the test can always be taken as a sign that one cannot pass the test in its more exacting form. Pamela's refusal to contemplate seriously the momentous act of suicide implies her submission to the conditions of the test, however unjust, unfair or brutal they may be.15 Submission to the test must not be confused with resignation because the test is still perceived as something to be overcome (a favorite word of Pamela's). Nevertheless, the hermeneutic of trial is radically and irredeemably anti-utopian, in that it requires us to accept as necessary and even valuable the conditions that produce unhappiness.
Pamela's narrative changes the way readers see and interpret the world. If, by the end of the trial narrative, Pamela comes to seem exemplary in her virtue, this is not simply because she survives the trial and suspends the hermeneutic of happiness with an unparalleled single-mindedness for the duration of the narrative. Also vital to this outcome is Pamela's ability to tell the narrative of this period of her life as a trial narrative. After Pamela is reconciled to Mr. B, and they walk the grounds together, Mr. B finds himself viewing the estate through Pamela's eyes. For example, when walking by the pond where Pamela once l5 Implicit in Pamela's acceptance of the trial and its injustices is a faith that the trial itself will never be excessive (98). Levi explains why, after Auschwitz, such faith becomes impossible, even though the seduction of the trial narrative can never be completely neutralized (158). Pamela teaches Mr, 8, just as her parents taught her, to read her account as a trial narrative. She must convince him that surviving the trial is not only a sign of her endurance but also a sign of her virtue because the sign has been submitted to an extreme and exacting test. The "Sincerity of [her] Professions" are to be judged by "what [she] ventur'd rather than be ruin'd." We can trust her narrative, she argues, because she sacrifices a part of her existence to prove it and, during this time, even abandons the hermeneutic of happiness to do so. Only because Mr. B gives credence to the trial narrative can he later say: "you bring me what is infinitely more valuable, an experienc'd truth, a well-try'd Virtue" (337). What is telling in this context is that Mr. B must be taught to read Pamela's experience as a trial narrative.
His comment is only one of many that confirm that the outcome of the novel depends on Pamela's ability to narrate her story as a trial narrative. Pamela herself acknorvledges the power of her narrative to secure her "Happiness": *'The very things that I most dreaded his seeing or knowing, the Contents of my Papers, have, as I hope, satisfy'd a11 his Scruples, and been a Means to promote my Happiness" (309) . It is not simply Pamela's touching account of "virtue in distress" that wins Mr. B over and makes possible their marriage." Distress is necessary to prove virtue because only her exemplary performance on the test could satisfy "all his Scruples." Pamela's ability to narrate her story as a series of trials that prove something is indispensable if she is to convince Mr. B that she is worthy of marriage.
So important is this point to an understanding of the novel that it is repeated in yet another context. Davers has already heard versions of Pamela's trials from other sources, but these are isolated incidents that cause her to pity Pamela's misfortunes without making Pamela eligible to marry her brother. These misfortunes must be recounted within the interpretive framework of a trial narrative in order to be persuasive. Only Pamela's narrative can "make me love you," as Davers says. It shows that she had, as she claims, "not a Thought of any thing, but to preserve my Innocence" (452). Pamela's ability to sacrifice all thought of happiness for her virtue is what allows her to earn the reward of happiness. By showing that happiness can only be granted once its absolute value has been called into question, Pamela exposes the bad conscience of the trial narrative: its desire to affirm and simultaneously to disavow the value of happiness.
The lesson of Pamela is enacted more simply and straightforwardly in Goldsmith's The Vicar of Wakefield. In that novel, the Vicar and his family endure a series of trials and misfortunes through which he retains an indomitable optimism. Because the Vicar proves incapable of reading his life as a trial narrative for much of the novel, his story reveals that the question of happiness remains important for him; he continues, however, to be subject to one calamity after another until he can eventually learn to view his life from the perspective of a trial narrative. Only in the sermon he preaches in prison, when the Vicar is finally able to renounce all thought of mundane happiness, does Thornhill appear on the scene to arrange happiness for everyone. Unlike The Vicar, which accounts for the Vicar's shift in hermeneutic attitudes simply by the multiplicity of trials he has endured, Pamela relentlessly thematizes the labor necessary to install a hermeneutic of trial in place of a hermeneutic of happiness. In order to succeed, Pamela must be read as a trial narrative---and the novel never ceases to insist on the propriety of this hermeneutic frame, nor does it tire of teaching its many readers how to read the unusual narrative form that it is.
I have tried to give Pamela's twin narrative strategies, the epoch and the narrative of testing, some formal precision throughout this reading. This, I submit, is the only way to locate the trial narrative's emergence as an autonomous narrative form in the eighteenth century. Tests and ordeals-trials in the loose sense of the word-are ubiquitous in narrative literature, especially the romance tradition, and some narratologists equate them with the basic events of narrative itself (Propp 39, 42; , but happiness is demonstrably the hermeneutic horizon in conventional romances. More perplexing for our purposes is the question of how to distinguish the trial narrative from the long Christian tradition of biographical narration. After all, this tradition is rife with lives of ordeal and testing that are not easily distinguished from the trial narrative proper. There is nothing more conventional than to describe Pamela, Clarissa and The Vicar as Job-narratives, to compare the protagonists to Christ and the mart-yrs, and to imagine that these are simply forms of "Christian fable" (Doody, Natural Passion 34). Indeed, contemporary readers of Richardson viewed his novels in precisely these terms (Eaves and Kimpel 121) . What such general comparisons obscure, however, is the distinctive contribution of the eighteenth-century trial narrative: the suspension of the hermeneutic of happiness by means immanent to the narrative. To read Christian biographical narratives as trial narratives in the strong sense, we are obliged to project the trial narrative backward from the eighteenth century, after it has already been naturalized.17
This is not to imply that the Christian tradition is irrelevant to the emergence of the trial paradigm. On the contrary, the trial narrative is fundamentally theological in structure and has a long history of gestation in Christian biographical forms.ls The detailed imagination of lives of trial and providential suffering find perhaps their most intense Christian expression in Puritan spiritual biographies such as Bunyan's Grace Abounding to the Chief of Sinners, and as theorists of the novel have noted, these biographies are important generic precursors of the eighteenth-century novel (McKeon; Starr). Milton is undoubtedly one of the most important contributors to the trial paradigm prior to the eighteenth ~e n t u r y .~V u t precisely because Milton remains a Christian author, he makes clearer than perhaps any other writer the internal limits to the full articulation of a trial narrative within the Christian tradition. Although Paradise Lost constantly puts its readers to the test, forcing them to internalize the hermeneutic habits of trial, this is never a trial by adversity. The test to which God puts the first pair is precisely not a trial narrative that demands the suspension of the hermeneutic of happiness. Adam and Eve are in Eden and happy while being tested. As Milton expresses the divine commandment: "for know,/ The day thou eat'st thereof, my sole command/ Transgressed, inevitably thou shalt die;/ From that day mortal, and Within the Christian tradition, Christ is arguably the unique subject of the trial narrative. There are insuperable theological obstacles (the doctrines of grace and original sin) to generalizing the trial paradigm to the faithful through the imitafio Christi. For the Christian believer, even during the worst trials, it is still possible to cling to the raft of the beatitudes and their promise of happiness, as an ineradicable vestige of the hermeneutic of happiness. For Pamela, such a faith would undermine the trial narrative itself. But even in the case of Christ, the narrative strategies for suspending the hermeneutic of happiness are not developed in the Gospels. this happy statel Shalt lose.. ." (Milton 8: 328-32, emphasis added) .1° On the other hand, if the Fall itself must be read as a lapse (epoch ) into a state of constant trial and tribulation, then it is telling that the poem ends with the departure from Eden, refusing to narrate the time of trial itself as Pamela so indulgently does.21 Thus, despite its long Christian prehistory, the trial narrative is a surprisingly late achievement and must be regarded as one of the most distinctive (and disturbing) accomplishments of the eighteenth century.
Collapse of the Hermeneutic of Happiness: Reification of Happiness as Reward
The labor required to install a hermeneutic of trial in the novel suggests that Pamela's narrative accomplishment is a feat indeed: that of refusing to admit the classical question of happiness for a portion of the narrative. But must we not admit, at the same time, that Pamela's achievement is also extremely limited in scope, having little effect on the concept of happiness itself? The hermeneutic of trial is only in effect for a carefully delimited period of the narrative---a state of emergency, as it were. At the novel's conclusion, moreover, it would seem that the question of happiness is restored to its full privilege and priority. Pamela ends with a narrative of happiness, apparently confirming that a hermeneutic of happiness is in effect for the second half of the narrative. The effects of the trial narrative, however, are more pernicious than we might anticipate. They make it impossible to read the second half of Pamela from within the framework of a hermeneutic of happiness.
We cannot underestimate the gravity of the effects of the trial narrative itself, or any other hermeneutic that would suspend the hermeneutic of happiness even temporarily. As soon as a trial takes place outside a wider hermeneutic horizon of happiness, disabling questions of happiness for a portion of the narrative, it always risks masking existential injustice in favor of epistemological questions and is, in this sense, radically anti-utopian. Not only are the trials that Mr. B puts Pamela through dignified with a meaning that obscures their violence by serving as the means for her to prove her virtue, but his injustices are also so invisible from the perspective of trial that Pamela can, by the conclusion of the trial narrative, rejoice at the possibility of marrying the man who almost raped her. There is no sense of resentment at his previous treatment of her and no sense that Mr. B must account for, let alone atone for, what he has done.22 If Mr. B cannot be called to account or brought to justice for his actions, it is because the trial narrative, as the instrument of "justice," is deaf to the appeals of happiness. The right to happiness, like the right of equity in Kant's Metaphysics of Morals, is a "mute Cf. Augustine on the happiness of the first couple (14.10). Oberman confirms that Calvin also reads the Genesis episode this way (266-68).
"
the importance of testing and of a certain suspension, or "pendency," in Milton, see Parker 12 and 132-42.
22
Eagleton also advocates an ethical frame for reading Cbrissa (Rape of Clarissa). He is correct that we need to insist on the "tragic" in Clarissa (Suteel Violence 74, 201) and Pamela. But his analysis fails to consider how the trial narrative conceals the tragic dimension of these narratives. Tragedy only becomes visible when we forcibly restore the hermeneutic of happiness.
divinity" that cannot be heard in a court of justice and can only say, incomprehensibly, paradoxically: summum ius, summa iniuria (59-60). Only by insisting on the hermeneutic of happiness can these and other injustices become visible again; only through the hermeneutic of happiness can the appeal to another justice, a justice beyond justice, be heard.
The concept of happiness must be radically transformed to accommodate the trial narrative.23 The judgment of happiness does not simply become a judgment on the portion of a narrative not dominated by the trial. Rather, happiness is now a reward for the successful negotiation of the trial. Its privilege is no longer an absolute privilege, as it is now valued only in relation to the trial. Moreover, happiness is reified in the strict sense of the word; it becomes something to be experienced in the plenitude of its presence, rather than a judgment on the totality of details in a biographical narrative.** Admittedly, happiness can still be talked about and described endlessly within a narrative. The uncontrollable multiplication of references to happiness in the second part of the novel-the "happy, happy, thrice happy Pamela" (345)-suggests that no other words are adequate to describe the extremity of Pamela's good fortune. But the very profusion of references to happiness means that happiness is not a hermeneutic question for the narrative. At no time do words seem to fail the loquacious Pamela more than when she is surprised with a visit from her father, who fears the worst, only to discover that Pamela is to be married to Mr. 8: It would be absurd to refuse the designation "narrative of happinessr' to a text that seems to be concerned with nothing besides happiness, but we are no longer speaking of a classical narrative of happiness. The judgment about Pamela's happiness does not depend on a biographical narrative. Rather, it exists independently of the narrative, which gestures impotently in the direction of an indescribable happiness with the hollow repetition of the word "happy." The question of Pamela's happiness does not haunt the text as an interpretive question about its totality and heterogeneity: it is already decided. Happiness has be-23 1 distinguish between the concept of happiness-which describes the conditions of the judgment of happiness and the content of what constitutes happiness-and the hevmeneutzc of happiness, which is the interpretive framework that places the question of happiness at the heart of any interpretation of a biographical narrative.
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Far an exemplary description of happiness as an experience of plenitude, see Rousseau, Reveries 88.
come an experience, which exists prior to and independently of the narrative and presumably transpires in the "ecstatick Minutes" Pamela describes. We are merely observers of this experience. The "happy Moments" and "ecstatick Minutes" that Pamela experiences endow happiness with the temporality of an affect rather than a judgment deferred to the end of a narrative. If Pamela's happiness is understood in the substantive form of a reward-her marriage to Mr. B-then narrating her happiness simply means representing the reward that constitutes the substantial content of her happiness. There is no hermeneutic burden in deciding whether she is happy or not, only the trivial question of determining whether she has been rewarded or not. The presence of the reward decides the question of happiness for us, in place of us, without us.
Once happiness is abstracted from narrative, it becomes incapable of supporting a hermeneutic. It becomes a completely private matter rather than a public matter, or even the public matter: the res publica. It is not coincidental, then, that the institution of marriage, which marks the boundary of the private in the eighteenth century, replaces the funeral oration as the privileged moment of happiness in such novels as Pamela and The Vicar of W~k e f i e l d .~~ Sentimentalism and the marriage plot serve as the counterparts to classical tragedy and the classical funeral oration in the wake of the trial narrative. Even in Clarissa, where death momentarily and uncharacteristically seems to reassert its privilege, death itself is determined as a kind of marriage by Clarissa, who imagines herself as a bride preparing "to meet the heavenly bridegroomf' (Watt 234).26 But marriage also acquires this privilege for a less obvious reason: of all the ways "reward" might be understood concretely, marriage subsumes within it several of the most important determinations. The narrative structure of courtship and marriage not only maps directly onto the scheme of trial followed by reward, but it can also be read as an allegory of a finite life of trial followed by an afterlife of happiness in heaven. Marriage often brings with it both wealth and social status, as it does in Pamela, which are two other ways in which the abstract idea of "reward" materializes. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, if happiness is often determined as pleasure, or the persistence of a certain intensity of pleasure, the "ecstatick Minutes" and "happy Moments" Pamela recounts, then marriage produces the domestic space which is increasingly understood as the proper domain of this affect (Stone; Hegel, Philosophy of Righf 110 ff.).27
Although the trial is always understood as temporary-a state of emergency or suspended time that must ultimately give way to a time of happiness-the tendency of the trial narrative is to expand and to colonize the entire space of narrative, leaving no space for a narrative of happiness. Why should the trial 25 See Aries on the way in which death increasingly becomes a private rather than a public matter in the eighteenth century (12) .
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See also Doody, Natural Passion 173.
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In Desire and Domestic Fiction, Armstrong argues that women become the paradigmatic modern subjects because they are consigned to the domestic and affective space that increasingly comes to be identified with the space of subjectivity itself. (See also My analysis confirms this, since women are the principal targets of the trial narrative that produces modern subjectivity.
narrative exhibit this colonizing logic? The trial narrative is a highly unstable form. The result it promises to deliver, the proof of virtue, is extremely precarious, as contemporary readers of Pamela immediately understood. The publication of Pamela spawned a public debate (a "media event," as Warner has described it) between the "pamelists" who believed that the trial narrative was a clear demonstration of Pamela's virtue and the "anti-pamelists" who believed that Pamela was merely feigning virtue in order to achieve the reward of marriage to Mr. B 258; Turner) . The narrative scheme of trial followed by reward always leaves the lingering suspicion that the hermeneutic of happiness was never suspended, that the heroine had endured her trials only for the sake of the happiness that awaits at the novel's conclusion. Thus, any trial narrative is embroiled in an inescapable paradox: it depends for its effects on suspending the hermeneutic of happiness and yet must concede the ultimate importance of happiness-a concession that threatens to nullify the effects of the trial. I call this the Shamela paradox, because no anti-pamelist diagnoses it more ruthlessly than Fielding does in his satire on Pamela. Shamela recasts Pamela as the conniving servant who wants nothing more than to marry her wealthy master while she continues her affair with Parson Williams. The satire works precisely by casting doubt on Pamela's claim to have suspended the hermeneutic of happiness.
Let me be clear: Fielding is not articulating a critique of the trial narrative form itself in Pamela. On the contrary, Shamela sets the agenda for the radicalization of the trial narrative paradigm-a project taken up by Rousseau and others. What Shamela shows is that the trial narrative fails when the reward is too visible within the narrative. Thus, in Clarissa, Richardson "solves" the problem of the Shamela paradox by deferring the reward beyond the bounds of narrative.28 Not surprisingly, Fielding approved of the refined trial narrative in Clarissa (Eaves and Kimpel 294)-this, despite the fact that from the point of view of narrative structure, Pamela and Clarissa are indistinguishable as trials of virtue (Eaves and Kimpel 278) . Indeed, Joseph Andrews and Tom Jones must be read as trial narratives too, though in a light-hearted idiom, because the protagonists achieve the reward of happiness only at the end, after their virtue has been proved in trials from which they expect no reward.29 Despite the superficial classicism of Fielding's novels, which might lead one to credit him with a more classical understanding of happiness, Fielding remains committed to the project of the trial narrative. Although nothing is more conventional in narratives of the rise of the novel than to set Richardson and Fielding in opposition, the question of happiness reveals the deeper complicity of these two novelists in their attempts to make the trial narrative the basis of modern subjectivity. As Fielding's response demonstrates, the audacious appearance of the trial narrative in Pamela raises more problems than it solves. Pamela and the Pamela debate are only the beginnings of a century-long process that would hone the strategies of the trial narrative. The response of readers to the Shamela paradox provides an engine of narrative innovation throughout the eighteenth century. By reversing the narrative structure of Pamela in his Julie, for example, Rousseau not only reveals the inadequacies of narrating a time of happiness when happiness is understood in abstraction from narrative; he also insists that the meaning of narrative is not to be found in the happiness achieved at its end, but in the process of trial itself. Happiness, if there is any, must be deferred to a time beyond narrative. To effect this deferral, Rousseau opens the novel, remarkably enough, not with a series of trials, but with the depiction of the lovers' overwhelming if tortured happiness. Sentimental outpourings dominate the nearly eventless first half of the narrative. Although the lovers consummate their love early in the novel, Rousseau's depiction of happiness is calculated to make us realize the insufficiency of such a narrative. It is not the illicit nature of the lovers' happiness that is thus called into question, but the dominance of happiness within the narrative itself. As we read in one of the letters, "[ilf love is a desire that is whetted by obstacles, . . . it is not good that it should be satisfied; it is better for it to endure and be unhappy than flicker out in the bosom of pleasures" (263). The suggestion here is that the obstacles to love must be multiplied in order to keep love alive, and the lovers must not be separated only in order to be brought together again. Their separation must be absolute and their trials incessant. The plot of Julie figures marriage not as the privileged site of a happiness that follows a trial, but as the site of the trial itself. In marrying a man she does not love, Julie enacts the lesson of the narrative: "happiness must be immolated to duty" (255). Julie's marriage to Wolmar must not be seen as the substitution of misfortune and unhappiness for the potential domestic and conjugal felicity she might have enjoyed with her lover. The marriage is indeed a perpetual trial of the lovers' virtue, especially since Wolmar invites Saint Preux to live with them (353, 408, 495) . Foreclosing the possibility of happiness ensures that the results of the trial of virtue will be more reliable than in Pamela.
Kant's ethics represents the most rigorous attempt in the century to "solve" the Shamela paradox. Viewed from a narratological perspective, the originality of Kant's ethics is not that it demands the suspension of the hermeneutic of happiness. The trial narratives of Richardson, Rousseau, and Goldsmith had already achieved this, and they provide the narrative and imaginative precondition for Kantian ethics. Rather, by constantly conceding the importance of happiness for ethics, for politics, for theology, for history, and yet always deferring happiness beyond the bounds of narrative, Kant achieves a compelling "solution" to the Shamela paradox. The Pamela debate, then, is not confined to the immediate aftermath of the publication of Pamela; it spills over into the rest of the century, producing further attempts (by such readers of Richardson as Kant and Rousseau) to radicalize the paradigm of the trial narrative.30 One might expect that the Shamela paradox would weaken the trial's grasp on the narrative imaginary. But in fact, it only serves to strengthen the trial paradigm's hold, tendentiously expanding the time of trial to fill the entire space of narrative.
Two further points should allow us to appreciate that, far from being limited in its scope, the collapse of the hermeneutic of happiness in eighteenth-century novels continues to haunt us today. First, the abstract understanding of happiness, inaugurated by the trial narrative, does not require a trial narrative in order to be maintained or deployed. To use an expression such as "I feel happy" is to testify to the persistence of an abstract understanding of happiness as an ineffable affect, an experience, which not only exists independently of narrative but even defies narrativization. The problem, of course, is not that the affect or experience we seek to describe is unimportant. The problem is twofold. When we attempt to accord the absolute privilege of the classical concept to the modern affective one, we discover that it cannot support this privilege. Happiness can come to seem either unrealistic, as it does within psychoanalysis, or banal and complacently self-indulgent, if not both. More importantly, when we use the word "happiness" to designate experiences abstracted from narrative, we are left with no word to describe the classical judgment, so that utopian thinking becomes the mere quest for narcissistic enjoyment. The classical concept must be reinvented each time by those who would think it, as in Nietzsche's doctrine of eternal return (273-74).
Second, although the eighteenth-century "trial of virtue" may strike us as archaic, we continue in subtle ways to interpret the narratives of our lives within the narrative schema of trial and reward. When we imagine the narratives of our lives divided between times of work and leisure, desire and consummation, we remain trapped in the form of the trial narrative and its determination of happiness. In The Trial, Kafka describes precisely the experience of a life shaped by trial even after the trial narrative has lost its justification. Kafka's novel grasps something fundamental about the novel form and the persistence of the trial narrative in later modernity. The classical concept of happiness offers us a powerful way to articulate a utopian challenge to such a narrative organization of our lives and the institutions that demand it, not in the name of a golden age long past, but in the name of a utopia that remains yet to come.
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